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Custom built products do not always meet the new Department of Defense (DoD) 
requirements anymore.  Their high cost and lengthy development cycle does not suit the 
Information Age where communication information and technology grow fast.  To adapt 
to this new environment, Commercial off The Shelf (COTS) products have become the 
core for Military systems.  This is the only way to approach the readiness requirements 
for armed forces.  Like any other products, COTS brings a lot of advantages but also 
carries a couple side effects for military systems.  One of the most concerning for military 
use of a COTS product is its security.  This thesis will provide analysis of approaches to 
identify the security vulnerabilities and recommended acquisition to minimize the issue.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, software technology has become the main part of the 
solution for military weaponry systems and other applications.  Software provides 
advanced functionality and helps to intelligently equip our forces to fight against any 
enemies and terrorists.  Software represents a significant portion of the defense program’s 
operational capacity and a significant portion of the government’s investment.   
According to the March 2004 report of General Accounting Office (GAO), the 
Department of Defense (DoD) spent $21 billion on software, representing 40 percent of 
the DoD Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation budget for fiscal year 2003 (GAO 
report, March 2004).  An estimated of 20% of the total DoD budget will be spent on 
software by 2007(GAO report, March 2004). 
Traditionally, military systems were developed based on customized software.  
The DoD bought only products that meet military specifications, also known as mil-spec 
products.  This method of software acquisition had a significant impact on government 
budgets due to immature technology and schedule slippage.  During the period of 1994 
through 1997, Mr. William Perry, Secretary of Defense, mandated a policy to reduce the 
dependency on expensive military specification products (Eland, 2002). To implement 
this policy, the DoD committed to use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products rather 
than buying mil-spec products.  COTS software has a lot of advantages as it incorporates 
newer technology and newer standards, and can be updated faster than custom-built 
software.  Maintenance cost is substantially reduced since COTS software is widely used 
by a large population.  However, COTS software has some disadvantages.   Since COTS 
software’s main purpose is to serve popular needs, it ignores some DoD requirements, 
such as inter-operability, robustness, and security.   
This thesis will identify the issues associated with the security of COTS software 
that are used in military systems.  The recommended approaches and techniques to 
alleviate the issues will be discussed.  It is not the intent of this thesis to find a universal 
approach to resolve the security issues of COTS software, but rather to seek ways to 
minimize them. 
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 This thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
• Chapter II identifies the issues of COTS software used in DoD applications 
and systems. 
• Chapter III identifies the security requirements of COTS software for DoD 
systems. 
• Chapter IV proposes three options for meeting DoD security requirements 
with COTS software and provides an analysis for each option. 
• Chapter V proposes some recommendations for both DoD acquisition and 
industry to increase the security requirements for COTS software. 




A. WHAT IS COTS? 
COTS is the acronym for Commercial Off The Shelf.  COTS products are 
described as either software or hardware products that are commercially available for 
sale, for lease, or for license to the general public.  They are defined by the market’s 
needs, not individual requests.  COTS systems can be composed of many other COTS 
software or hardware components. 
Due to the scope of this thesis, only COTS software will be discussed. 
COTS software has with the following characteristics:  
• The source code is in the form of a “black box” because it is delivered in 
binary code which protects a vendor’s proprietary design.  Binary code is 
impossible to reconvert to source code. 
• It is significant in functionality and very complex. 
• It has periodic releases with newly added features, error fixes, or upgrades 
for technology advancement. 
• The general nature of COTS software design is not to interoperate with 
other COTS products. 
With all of these characteristics, the DoD wants to use COTS as part of either 
their new developments or upgrades to legacy applications.   
B. WHY IS COTS SOFTWARE A REQUIREMENT IN THE DOD 
SYSTEMS?  
Software is a crucial part of our everyday life.  It becomes a core part of our basic 
daily activities that we do not even notice (Main, October 2005).  It allows us to make 
phone calls, check movie show times on-line, access email, and operate cars, as 
examples.  Every single button we push or number we dial from our telephone is 
controlled by software.  It allows the passing of information or data from one end of the 
telephone network to another.  Movie show times are available on the Internet through 
different websites. Business organizations allow their employees to access work email 
from home and other remote locations. A preprogrammed computer controls most parts 
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of a car.  Airplanes are constructed with millions of lines of code.  All of these activities 
are supported by industrial software. In other words, software development and its 
acquisition are driven by industry.  Human demands increase with higher expectations 
and a more advanced society.  In order to meet society’s needs, software development is 
changing more rapidly than ever before. The development trends are highly dependent on 
technology, the Internet, and its network.  As these change, so does software 
development. This requires the commercial marketplace to be in the driver’s seat of 
technology advancement, not the DoD. With these changes, there is tremendous 
opportunity for new commercial systems to implement unprecedented capabilities. The 
commercial software needs to stay abreast of the technology, needs to apply the 
technology, and needs to integrate those technologies in a timely manner for commercial 
needs.  This trend also affects DoD acquisitions. Military systems have to be more 
flexible, scalable, and configurable so that they can satisfy these changing needs. 
Therefore, demands and requirements for more robust, faster, more integrate-able, and 
more user-friendly systems are increasing. The intent is to satisfy these requirements with 
COTS software solutions. In fact, in 1994, William Perry, Secretary of Defense, was first 
to initiate the mandated use of commercial products and practices in DoD systems and 
applications (Eland, 2002).  The use of commercial off-the-shelf software became the 
basis for core information technology needs and requirements for the military.   
COTS software is expected to be very beneficial to DoD acquisition.  The most 
important advantage of using COTS product is to satisfy the requirement to be cost 
effective.  It is often cheaper to buy commercial pre-existing software rather than to build 
the same component from scratch or to have it custom built.  License fees and 
performance are predictable.  Maintenance cost can be divided equally over the number 
of customers and licenses and is, therefore, very inexpensive.  The extra time to test the 
software is not required for COTS software during the development phase.  
Another advantage is that it has a faster procurement process since it can be reused in 
other applications. In addition, from the technical perspective, COTS software usually 
accommodates the latest mature technology and provides rich functionality products.     
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Recognizing the advantages of COTS products, the DoD has released official 
policies to guide its acquisition in using COTS products for different types of military 
systems to maximize benefits.  The following documents have been found to guide the 
use of COTS products in DoD: 
The Clinger - Cohen Act was formally published in February 1996 but it did not 
take effect until August 1996. Its guidance is to incorporate commercial technology for 
“equipment or systems of equipment used in automatic acquisition, storage, 
manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, 
transmission, or reception of data or information by the executive agency” (DoD, 
February 1996). 
Franklin Raines, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director, in his 
memorandum provided guidance for federal information systems as “support work 
processes that have been simplified or otherwise redesigned to reduce costs, improve 
effectiveness, and make maximum use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology” 
(Raines, 1996). 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), part 12 stated, “acquisitions should 
purchase commercial or non-developmental items (C/NDI) when they are available and 
they meet the needs of the organization” (GSA) 
DoD Regulation 5000.2 “exploits and reuse COTS” and “consider C/NDI [to be] 
the primary source of supply” (DODD 5000.2). 
Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) and Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) 
Common Operating Environment (COE) guidance are essentially based on commercial 
standards and products. 
C. ISSUES WITH COTS IN DOD APPLICATIONS 
Unfortunately, using COTS products for military applications has some 
drawbacks.  First, security is the greatest concern for the military due to the 
characteristics of COTS.  COTS software is consumed in the form of a “black box” or 
“as-it-is”.  There is no security warranty.  With COTS, functionality takes higher priority 
than security. In other words, security is usually at the bottom of the list.  COTS software 
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is widely available which increases the risk that it falls into the hands of users with 
malicious intent. These users have the potential to uncover security flaws, which then 
puts the software and systems built on the software at risk for attack.  COTS software is 
large and complex with millions of lines of source code (Lipson, Mead, and Moore); 
hence, program bugs can easily lead to security vulnerabilities.  
Configuration control is also a nightmare.  COTS vendors constantly update their 
software to apply new technology and to meet the majority of their customers’ demands.  
Upgrades usually require other updated components from multiple vendors and usually 
upgrades are not backward compatible with the rest of the system.   
In this thesis, only security issues will be discussed.   
1. Historic Events of Unsecured Software in DoD Programs 
In highly reliable DoD systems, the defect of any function or software component 
may result in tragedy and cost.  Let us review some history of events: 
• In December 1994, hackers attacked the U.S. Naval Academy's computer 
systems and deleted the master backup file from one system.  It blocked 
access for authorized users to another system and tampered with twelve 
thousand passwords and compromised a main router, the electronic 
equivalent of a computer system's arteries. According to the General 
Accounting Office report in May 1996, "the attacks caused considerable 
disruptions to the Academy's ability to process and store sensitive 
information" (Browning). 
• Hackers attacked Rome Laboratory, the Air Force’s premier command and 
control research facility in New York, in March and April 1994.  The 
attackers used Trojan horses and sniffers to access and control Rome's 
operational network. Hackers took over control of Rome's support systems 
for several days, copied and downloaded critical information such as air 
tasking order systems’ data. The estimate of attack’s cost was over 
$500,000 which included time to take systems off the networks, verify 
systems’ integrity, install security patches, restore service, and costs 
incurred by the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and 
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Information Warfare Center.  The cost incurred from losing data was not 
included because the attackers were never arrested (Slabodkin).  
• During 1995 and 1996, an Argentinean hacker used Internet connections 
to break into computers at the Naval Research Laboratory, NASA, Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, and other Defense Department sites. 
According to the GAO, the systems contained "sensitive research 
information, such as aircraft design, radar technology, and satellite 
engineering that is ultimately used in weapons and command and control 
systems" (GAO Report, 1996).   
• “Dutch hackers who pillaged computer files at thirty four U.S. military 
sites in the months leading up to the Gulf War offered the information to 
Iraqi leaders, a former Energy Department official said in March. The 
hackers not only learned the exact locations of U.S. troops and the types of 
weapons they had, but also gained information about the capability of the 
Patriot missile and the movement of American warships, Eugene Schultz, 
the former head of computer security at Energy, told a London 
newspaper” (Browning). 
•  “A hacker who broke into and defaced the Air Force site on the World 
Wide Web, the multimedia corner of the Internet, late in December forced 
the temporary closure of eighty Web sites that carried, among other things, 
information on Gulf War illnesses” (Browning). 
• In September of 1997, the Yorktown's propulsion system failed. The ship 
had to be towed to a Navy base at Norfolk, and the ship was not restored 
to operational status for two days. The culprit? The software running on 
PCs designed to control the ship crashed, taking the rest of the ship down 
with it.  The Navy had a policy of using commercial off-the-shelf 
hardware and software. The Smart Ship program used standard Pentium 
Pro PCs and the standard operating system Windows NT 4.0.  It turned out  
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the software that was used for Yorktown had bugs including the operating 
system.  NT 4.0 was unreliable and caused the failure (Carhart, Chan, and 
Hu, 2000).  
• “In 1998, the accidental failure of the Galaxy IV satellite disrupted over 
thirty five million pagers across the United States for two to four days, and 
blocked credit card authorization of point of sale terminals” (Poulsen).  
• In January 2001, the attack of Code Red, Nimda, one of the most costly 
assaults launched across the Internet in fifteen minutes took down three 
hundred thousand Internet servers, 911 emergency phone service, ATM 
machines across the US, and a major airliner’s automated reservation 
system. This attack resulted from the security vulnerabilities in Microsoft's 
Internet Information Services (IIS) Web server product (Costello). 
• In August 2004, hackers took down the weaknees.com, amazon.com, and 
the Department of Homeland Security Web sites. The attacks caused more 
than $2 M in damage (Krebs). 
According to a report from the Treasury Department's Office in December 2005, 
the cost of cyber crime in 2004 went up to $105 B.  Also, the military spends about two 
billion dollars each year on information assurance on encryption systems and Research 
and Development (R&D) for new capabilities (Wait). 
2. Types of COTS Software Security 
Security vulnerabilities are the results of software weaknesses, faults, logical 
errors, and flaws.  Depending on how COTS software components are used in DoD 
system, their misbehaviors can breach the security via the following methods: 
• The component might allow accessing unauthorized resources or services 
of the system (Zhong and Edward). 
• The component might allow accessing a resource in an unauthorized way 
that causes another component to fail its functions in the system (Zhong 
and Edward). 
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• The component might abuse authorized privileges and take control over 
the system or other components of the system (Zhong and Edward).  
The DoD has taken steps and released policies in an effort to reduce the cost of 
and to minimize the number of security breaches. This will be discussed in further detail 
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III. COTS SOFTWARE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
Knowing that COTS software will never meet DoD security demands and 
realizing the damages, cost, and risks if deploying unsecured COTS software for military 
applications, DoD still wants to use it to fill the core information technology needs for the 
military because of other advantages such as advanced and mature technology, timing, 
and readiness. 
The security requirement is clearly stated in DODI 8500.1, “all DoD information 
systems shall maintain an appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
non-repudiation, and availability that reflect a balance among the importance and 
sensitivity of the information and information assets; documented threats and 
vulnerabilities; the trustworthiness of users and interconnecting systems” (DODD 
8500.1) and “all military voice radio systems, to include cellular and commercial 
services, shall be protected consistent with the classification or sensitivity of the 
information transmitted on the system” (DODD 8500.1).   
In the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, paragraph 9.3.1, requirement for security 
testing “commercial items, regardless of the manner of procurement, undergo DT&E to 
verify readiness to enter IOT&E, where operational effectiveness, suitability, and 
survivability for the intended military application are demonstrated. Programs should not 
enter IOT&E unless the DoD Components are confident of success” (DODD 5000).  
Unfortunately, DoD policies and guidance are not currently addressing how to 
protect software. It focuses primarily on operational threats, not insider threats such as 
the insertion of malicious code by software developers.   
The next chapter will propose three techniques to improve security for COTS software 
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IV. TECHNICAL APPROACHES AND ANALYSIS 
To reduce the vulnerability of COTS software, there are currently three 
approaches recommended by the Chief Scientist of the Cost Research Department at 
PRICE systems, Arlene Minkiewicz (Minkiewicz).  
Each approach will be discussed in detail with techniques, advantages, and 
disadvantages.   
A. BUYING COTS AND WRAPPERS 
1. What is a Wrapper?   
Software wrapper is considered as a shell or a box that isolates a component from 
other components and its processing environment. It is responsible for connecting 
information sources to external components (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.   Wrapper Technique 
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In terms of the security wrapper, it provides necessary transformations and 
filtrations of data that is coming in and out of the wrapped components. It disallows 
unwanted information to enter the component by placing a software barrier around the 
component.  It also controls the outputs of the component. 
2. Buy-and-Wrap Approach 
In this option, the DoD agency or project manager plans to purchase the COTS 
components that best meet the functional requirements for the system. Then, the project 
manager will have developers build security wrappers to secure these purchased 
components.   
There are two different methods that can be used to develop security wrappers.   
The first method is to keep certain inputs from reaching the component.  
Wrappers filter inputs before they are called from the COTS component. Wrappers only 
allow the call from the COTS component if the input is likely to produce acceptable 
behavior.  This is the way to prevent the execution of improper inputs, and this may limit 
the component’s output range.  
The second method of incorporating a wrapper is to capture the outputs before the 
component releases them. Outputs will be checked to ensure they meet certain constraints 
and then the wrapper will qualify the outputs before release.  
Both methods can be used at the same time to minimize the vulnerabilities of 
COTS components.  
3. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Using wrappers does not mean that the component is free of vulnerabilities. 
Unwanted outputs sometimes bypass a wrapper due to the design of the wrapper. For 
example, if it is not known that a component can call the operating system to delete a file, 
the wrapper probably won’t be designed to prevent it. If, however, it is known that the 
component needs to delete temporary files that it creates, the wrapper can be designed to 
allow only file delete requests pertaining to those temporary files. The value of wrappers, 
then, depends on how well they are designed. They cannot protect against events 
unanticipated by developers—such as those events caused by Trojan horses.   
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This approach is both complex and prone to errors.  The significant problem is 
that the system developer must write code that gracefully handles inputs that cannot 
properly be handled by the COTS component.  Designers should ensure that the wrapper 
is correctly filtering unwanted inputs and outputs.  This is extremely difficult since the 
COTS components are delivered in a “black box” and in binary executable form.  
Furthermore, wrappers are unable to track all temporary files (outputs) that are created 
during and after the wrapping operation.  A good example is the Microsoft Word 
application.  The undo feature allows the creation of a temporary buffer file where data is 
immediately stored.  This way, the application can let the operator perform the undo and 
redo functions.  Wrappers have to capture all of the temporary files in order to ensure the 
component is a hundred percent secured.  
There are advantages for this approach. First, there are a variety of COTS vendors 
who provide the components that can meet the DoD requirements.  This results in buying 
better and cheaper products. The second advantage is maintenance.  The level of reuse of 
wrappers can be maximized.  The modification of a security wrapper is a minimal effort 
if one COTS component is replaced with another.  This approach also fits well into the 
long and painful process of DoD certification procedures. The last advantage of this 
approach is that it will be independent of the wrapper updates if the inputs and outputs of 
the component remain unchanged.    
B. BUYING ONLY PRE-CERTIFIED COMPONENTS 
Before getting into the approach, we need to understand the definition of 
Common Criteria.  
1. What is Common Criteria? 
Common Criteria is a process to evaluate the reliability of computer products.  It 
is recognized as an international standard.  It uses a numerical rating to reflect the 
assurance requirements, Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), of a computer product.  
There are seven EAL levels which range from EAL1 to EAL7 (GAO Report, March 
2006).  The higher the evaluation level is, the more secure the product is. Depending on 
the level of security required for the system, COTS can be certified at one of the seven 
levels.  EAL1 is the lowest level where security functions are certified by analysis.  
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Certified products at this level provide some operational confidence but are weak on 
threats.  Usually, EAL1 is used only if damages to a product cause minimal damage to 
the agency and the risk of threats is also very low.  An example of this would be if the 
threat only appeals to amateur hackers.   To certify a product at EAL1, a vendor only 
needs to provide very basic documentation for analysis.   The vendor also has to provide 
useful protection against identified threats.  For DoD applications, any threat or damage 
to a DoD application might cause result in loss of life or loss of millions of dollars.     
EAL2 is relevant to products that may incur some, yet a small amount of damage 
to consumers when products fail (GAO Report, March 2006).  
EAL3 is applicable to products that may allow a few instances of serious damage 
if the application fails (GAO Report, March 2006). 
EAL4 is for products that may allow serious to extreme damages if the product 
fails. Also, these products have a high risk of attack (GAO Report, March 2006).  
EAL5 is applied to high risk products.  In this case, damage caused by the failing 
security requirement may lead to serious financial or a breach in infrastructure of the 
consumer (GAO Report, March 2006). 
EAL6 is applied when a product has a high risk of being attacked.  Currently, 
there is no application that is certified at the EAL6 level or higher (GAO Report, March 
2006).  
EAL7 is applied to products that bring a very high risk of being attacked.  These 
types of products may incur damages where the failing products are significant to many 
consumers (GAO Report, March 2006).   
2. Approach and Technique 
Currently, COTS products can be certified for security based on EAL by the 
National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) which is a Government agency and 
is managed by National Security Agency (NSA).    
 17
The principle of this approach is that the DoD agency purchases the COTS 
products that are certified or stamped with the required level of DoD security level 
(Minkiewicz).   
The process is very simple for COTS vendors who want to certify their products 
and is depicted in Figure 2.  First, vendors will submit product documentation and the 
COTS software to the NAIP laboratory.  Documents have to include a protection profile 
and security target for the product.  NAIP lab will then go through its internal process of 
evaluation, test, and validation.  NAIP then issues the report.  If the product passes the 
common criteria of the requested level, NAIP then issues the certification and publishes 
the product in the validated product list.  A DoD project then can select a certified COTS 
product for its development and integration.     
 
 
Figure 2.   Certification process of COTS product through NAIP (GAO Report, 
March 2006) 
 
There are two options to certifying upgraded products.  One option is to validate 
only the updated portion.  The other option is to send the whole product through the 
process.  The option is up to the software vendor.   
The fee and the time it takes to certify vary.  For example, it takes from four to 
nine months to have software certified at EAL2.  The fee is in the range from $80,000 to 
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$200,000.  For EAL4, it takes up to 24 months and the fee is up to $350,000.  The higher 
the EAL level the longer it takes, and the higher cost.  Prices to certify at EAL6 and 
EAL7 have not been released (GAO Report, March 2006).    
3. Advantages and Disadvantages 
As an advantage, this approach allows the products to be used with some 
confidence levels.  It might also reduce the integration effort in trying to develop 
protection for COTS software components.   
This approach has a limitation in that vendors are put in a position to satisfy the 
system’s security requirements.  In addition, only certified COTS components will be 
evaluated as candidates for use.  This prolongs the development time and increases the 
integration effort since it limits the selection.  It may also lead to the necessity to develop 
more in-house functionality if properly certified components are unavailable for some 
functional requirements.  
The certifications seem to be somewhat wasteful.  The Common Criteria 
certification is not necessarily associated with strong and secure products.  Rather, EALs 
refer to the level of confidence of the evaluation; they are not the level of security the 
product provides.  We can use Microsoft Windows as an example.  It is certified at 
EAL4, but the product is not secure. Vulnerabilities appear on a regular basis where 
consumers receive security patches and “hotfixes” monthly and quarterly.   
These metrics of certification are hard to quantify due to the limitation of the 
evaluation environment.  When a COTS vendor submits their software, there is a list of 
assumptions for the product such as inputs, operational environment, operating system, 
hardware platform, memory, and third party applications such as drivers, and other 
things.  A wide range of tests needs to be run in order to collect enough data and 
confidently analyze the software.  In addition, there is no warranty that the lab or 
evaluator was able to create every case that consumers might run into that might cause 
damage to the software. 
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This approach is likely to increase the purchase and maintenance costs of COTS 
components.  Every update of COTS has to go through the certification process.  It takes 
additional time and costs more money to certify the update.  
The certification process is not practical.  It sounds like a “pay for play” game that 
COTS vendors have to sign up for.  Any industry who wants to sell products to 
government organizations is required to be at least EAL2.  To be certified at EAL2, the 
only thing a vendor needs to do is to document and describe what their product actually 
does. 
C. BUYING COTS AND CERTIFYING IN-HOUSE 
The principle of this approach is that the DoD agency purchases the COTS 
software that best meets its requirements and then has these components certified at the 
DoD required security level. The Project Manager who decides to buy those COTS 
components will be fully responsible for complying with DoD security requirements and 
having to go through a DoD certification process.    
1. Methods 
There are two methods that the purchaser can use to certify their COTS software 
in-house. 
a. Black Box Testing 
The fundamental of this technique is to treat the test component as a 
“black-box”.  The principle of black-box testing is to test the functionality of the software 
(Du).   It is similar to testing an electronics part.  Consider a light bulb as an example.  A 
consumer buys it, installs it, and turns the switch on.  If the light does not light up, the 
bulb will be removed and returned to the store or the manufacturer.  The same approach 
applies for software.  It is tested without any analysis of the code and testers do not need 
to have any knowledge of the software. They only have to see if it works by flipping 
switches (inputs) and seeing what happens to the lights and dials (outputs).  It is used to 




Figure 3.   Black Box Testing 
 
The advantage of this approach is that it does not require the 
understanding of the internal structure of the software; therefore, a low level technical 
person can run the test, which reduces the expense of training.  In some cases, the test can 
be set up to run automatically.   The black box test does not require accessing the 
vendor’s source code (Voas).     
However, this method requires that the tester has the knowledge of "legal" 
inputs and what the expected outputs are for legal inputs. This can be very hard for DoD 
systems since a certifier has to go through a test case for every allowed input. The test 
case is another issue in that a tester has to be able to identify every condition of the 
software for every case of input in order to catch all errors that are potential 
vulnerabilities for the software. Using a black box test alone to certify a COTS 
component is insufficient due to the limitation of test cases (Du).  A tester might not be 
able to test all cases or be able to create all test cases that fail the test software 
component.  For example, a software vendor claims that the inputs for software they 
market can handle 255 characters.  Will tester check all cases?  This will include over 
255 cases that tester has to run.  She or he has to test all 255 cases that would produce the 
expected results.  In addition, the tester also needs to run cases outside the set limit.  It 
might be impossible for tester to run all cases with all combinations of test cases.  
b. Fault Injection   
Fault injection has been used widely for different purposes.  It is used to 
test hardware for tolerances such as finding fault time on hardware (CPU, circuits, 
electronic parts, etc.).  This technique is also used extensively in testing software 
effectiveness.  In the context of this thesis, it is used to test the security vulnerabilities for 
COTS software.  The main goal of the fault injection approach is to insert faults into the 
COTS software to test the security tolerance (Clark & Pradhan).  There are three methods 
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to insert faults.  If a fault is injected before the execution of the COTS application, it is 
called pre-execution fault injection – the first method.  The second method is called 
execution fault injection.  Faults are injected when the application is running.  The third 
method is the combination of the first and second ones.  This means that faults are 
injected before and during the application execution (Du).  An overview of such methods 
is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Fault Injection Methods to test security of COTS software (Johansson) 
 
 
The fault infection method, no matter which method is used, has the 
following steps (Johansson): 
- (1) Finding the fault injection point  
- (2) Defining faults 
- (3) Injecting the faults 
- (4) Analyzing outputs for the vulnerabilities    
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The challenges for the fault injection approach are in steps 1, 2, and 4.  
Fault injection allows inserting errors without understanding how the software is 
structured but it requires understanding the software behavior in order to analyze the 
outputs.  This technique relies on the security reviewer’s knowledge.  The result of the 
analysis is very important in the conclusion of whether the products are vulnerable or not.  
For example, if the result returns a positive evidence of vulnerability, there are two cases.  
If the viewer correctly analyzes the result, then the software is in high risk of security 
breach, or, if the reviewer’s analysis is incorrect, the software might be free of 
vulnerabilities.  Another issue with this approach is that it does not catch all 
vulnerabilities due to missing defined faults.     
On the positive side, this approach can detect systematic anomalies due to 
the functional anomalies tests.  Fault injection can also be done automatically.        
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of this Option Approach 
This approach allows the detection of systematic anomalies besides security 
breaches.  It increases the confidence level of the product since reviewers analyze outputs 
in multiple cases.  This approach can also be done at some automatic level which reduces 
the cost in resources.  Third, once fault models are developed, they can be reused to test 
the updated version of the COTS software.  This approach allows the wide choice of 
available vendors that meet other DoD requirements. 
However, this approach is a very risky.  First, if the certification fails, the buyer 
must then restart the evaluation and selection process to identify other potential solutions 
and must contend with the fact that they have wasted effort in purchasing unsecured 
software that does not meet the requirements (Minkiewicz).  Secondly, it takes days and 
months to come up with the test template as well as developing the fault injection 
approach.  This is not a cost effective approach. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As software vulnerabilities are inevitable and as the military moves from 
yesterday’s MIL-SPEC procurements to COTS-based procurements and strategies, the 
risk of being vulnerable is getting higher.  The military is going from yesterday’s MIL-
SPEC procurements to COTS-SPEC procurements to take the advantage of new 
technology and cost effectiveness, but only if they can adapt to commercially available 
software.  The technologies and methodologies to minimize vulnerabilities of such DoD 
software systems come to the attention of not only DoD acquisition personnel but also 
commercial software producers.   This chapter will propose recommendations for both 
the DoD acquisition community and industry to reduce the security risk for COTS 
software. 
Before getting into the recommendation, we first need to look at what are the 
causes of software vulnerabilities. Secondly, we look at the differences between DoD and 
commercial acquisition. Lastly, recommendations to reduce the risk of software security 
vulnerability in DoD and commercial are introduced. 
A. CAUSES OF SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES 
There are two main factors that can result in a software breach.  The first one is 
due to poor specification, design, and architecture.  The second one relates to 
programming bugs.  
Most of the time, DoD specifications describe security requirements vaguely and 
poorly.  Reviewing some DoD projects, the most common phrase is “Information 
Assurance (IA) compliance” in the specification and the Statement of Work (SOW).  
What does it mean? At what secure level does the software have to be in order to meet 
the “compliance” requirement?  Each EAL has its own requirements for security. DoD 
plans to buy COTS software with vague and weak security requirements.  In addition, 
commercial software vendors only concentrate on cost, schedule, features, and functions 
requirements most of the time.  Security requirements become “nice-to-have” functions.  
This means that security issues will be left for the maintenance phase of the acquisition.  
For example, at the buying phase, a COTS product is used as a component for a web 
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application and the requirement of the application only concentrates on the data rate.  
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is used in that COTS software to meet the data 
transferring rate.  There is no other requirement such as “guaranteed delivery.”  The 
selection of that COTS product has jeopardized the application with the unreliable 
protocol, UDP.   As a matter of fact, UDP has been implemented into some Trojan horse 
viruses.  Hackers develop scripts and Trojans to run over UDP in order to mask their 
activities.  UDP packets are also used in Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.  UDP meets the 
performance requirement (data rate) but does not satisfy the unwritten security 
requirements.  Many times, specifications do not clearly define the mission-critical and 
security requirements of the software.  This leads to the high risk of security breach.   
Besides specifications, programming bugs also constitute security breaches.  
Programming bugs such as errors, flaws, mistakes, failure, or faults during the code 
writing process can be created by careless programmers.  The common semantic errors 
includes dividing by zero, infinite loops, arithmetic overflow or underflow, exceeding 
array bounds, using an uninitialized variable, accessing memory not owned, allowing 
memory leak, stack overflow, buffer overflow, deadlock, loss of precision in type 
conversion, and others.  The results of software bugs could cause serious security 
breaches.  For example, from the BBC news on 18 March 2003, the loophole error in the 
Windows 2000 operation caused a security breach and the US Army server was about to 
be attacked.  With this loophole, attackers could have completely taken control over 
hacked computers and gotten into secure information from other server computers. 
Fortunately, there were no serious damages since the Windows 2000 patch came out at 
the right time and the US Army server was not connected to important servers at that 
time.  Let us take a look at another example.  Code errors can cause a buffer overrun, 
which can lead to the exploits of a Blaster worm.  Blaster attacks a computer by blocking 
or restarting the affected computers, and then it rapidly spreads through the network.  
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DOD AND COMMERCIAL ACQUISITION  
Next, let us take a look at the differences between DoD and commercial 
acquisition in order to have a better recommendation.   
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From the procurement perspective, military software requires tremendous time in 
preparing competitive bids, or request for proposals (RFPs).  DoD already spends a 
significant portion of its budget creating RFPs.  There are considerable sets of deliveries 
such as status reports, financial reports, schedules, meetings, and others.  These deliveries 
are usually expensive which leads to the high cost of the final product.   On an average, a 
military project spends about 50% of its budget on paper work.  DoD services are non-
profit agencies and are not as motivated to be driven by the “bottom line”, so they tend to 
overspend or develop software in a way that is more costly than the commercial sector.  
If the fundamental mission requirements are not compromised, there is no reason for 
them to improve.  Military procurement also involves contract law and policies that often 
result in a schedule delay on an average from six to 18 months before reaching a final 
procurement decision that allows the contractor to start the work. Military management 
has the tendency to rush the development phase to accommodate the time spent on 
developing the RFP.  Unfortunately, schedule pressure causes software failures.   
From the requirement aspect, military software is function-driven.  It is complex 
since it deals with weapon systems, communications, radars, and other technical systems.  
Software is created to serve military operations in both peace and wartime.  Mission, 
safety, reliability, and security are important.  Military requirements pay attention to the 
quality of the product.  The commercial sector has a more benefit-driven acquisition.  On 
the other hand, COTS software producers are trying to minimize spending, shorten 
development time, and create the most profitable products.  Therefore, quality control is 
minimal.  This explains why COTS software has a lot of bugs.      
Regarding effects of a failure, if military software fails, the operation may fail, 
lives might be lost, a battle might be lost, and national security also may be in jeopardy.  
In the commercial world, there are no laws that punish software vendors if their product 
fails.  The worst case that can happen is that they may have to refund money at some 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOD AND COMMERCIAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
To reduce the risk of being breached when commercial software products are 
embedded in military systems, the software security requirement should be given a top 
priority and concern.    
1. Recommendations for DoD Acquisition   
To ensure highly secure COTS software, DoD acquisition should change the old 
mentality of “all about writing reports and counting those reports" (Holmes). 
First of all, DoD has to clearly define security requirements for COTS 
components as well as the system.  DoD acquisition personnel have to create a document 
that clearly and completely identifies all security requirements and objectives. This 
document should be created by the DoD acquisition personnel and reviewed by the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) of the organization. This document should be similar to the 
Protection Profile defined in CC standard where it completely describes security 
objectives, security related functional requirements, and information assurance 
requirements.  This document should be used during the bidding or choosing the best 
COTS components. 
After security requirements are fully defined, a method for choosing secure COTS 
components in DoD application has to be established.  As stated previously in Chapter 
IV, the approach 2 (Buying Pre-Certified COTS only) with the addition of developing 
and using fault injection is recommended. Software developers cannot be counted on to 
determine if the certified COTS component can be claimed as secure.  Reality proves that 
pre-certified COTS products still have the high risk of security breach.  The most famous 
product is Microsoft Windows.  Although Window XP was certified as EAL4 in 
November 2005, patches have been continuously updated.  For this reason, fault injection 
should be developed and used to minimize security breaches.  Using the fault injection 
method will increase the confidence level of the software being vulnerability-free.  Even 
though the development of fault injection is expensive, it is worth it to test for those 
costly COTS software and for mission-critical applications.    
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DoD acquisition should carefully analyze software to see if the security 
requirements of COTS software meet the system application.  Budden, senior programs 
manager at AVISTA in the CrossTalk Journal published in February 2003, recommended 
the process in Figure 5. (Budden).  
 
 




It is important to note that standalone COTS certification does not mean that the 
COTS components are safe for use in the military as a system.  It only means that the 
COTS component has the low risk of a security breach.  Certification should be done in 
the environment that the COTS components operate, not through documentation and 
other environments. 
DoD has its own process to certify and accredit information technology systems. 
DoD just published DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DIACAP) in June 2006.  This process serves the same purpose as the DoD Information 
Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) that is to certify 
& accredit DoD systems for information assurance.  The only major differences between 
the two processes are that DIACAP adds the Net-centricity, Global Information Grid 
(GIG) and Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) concepts.  Both 
processes are very similar in terms of required tasks for certification.  Since the scope of 
the thesis is in the COTS software, concepts of Net-centricity, GIG, and FISMA are not 
the issue of COTS software, they are more at system level; only the DITSCAP will get 
introduced.  The second reason that the thesis only discusses DISCAP is that DIACAP is 
new and it has not been widely applied to any DoD systems yet.  Details of each task can 
be found in DODI 5200.40. 
DITSCAP composes of four main phases: Definition, Verification, Validation, 
and Post Accreditation (DODI 5200.40). Phase 1 is to understand the mission, the 
environment and its architecture to determine the security requirement level. Phase 2 
verifies the evolving system’s compliance with the System Security Authorization 
Agreement (SSAA) established process. Phase 3 validates the information set forth in 
Phase 2 and, finally, Phase 4 starts after the system has been certified and ensures the 
maintenance of system security.  At each phase, specific tasks and documentation are 
assigned and must be completed to exit the current phase and ready to go to the next 
phase.   
Phase 1 is considered as the definition phase.   
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Figure 6.   Phase 1 – Definition (DODI 5200.40) 
 
In this phase, the tasks of gathering information about the target system and its 
environment and agreeing on security requirements, level of effort, schedule, and 
resources necessary to complete the process have to be executed.   
Once these two tasks complete, Phase 2 can start with verifying the target 
system's compliance with the information agreed upon in Phase 1, identifying and 
analyzing vulnerabilities, and verifying that appropriate security controls are in place. 
 
Figure 7.   Phase 2 – Verification (DODI 5200.40) 
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Phase 3 will continue after all tasks in Phase 2 are complete.  Phase 3 includes 
conducting tests to validate that the target system’s security controls meet applicable 
requirements and produces evidence to assist the designated approving authority (DAA) 
in making an informed decision to grant approval to operate the system. 
 
Figure 8.   Phase 3 – Validation (DODI 5200.40) 
 
The last phase of the process is called Post Accreditation.  It begins after initial 
accreditation.  The tasks will include monitoring changes to the operational and threat 
environments to ensure an acceptable level of residual risk is preserved and conducting 




Figure 9.   Phase 4 – Post Accreditation (DODI 5200.40) 
 
DITSCAP is considered as the best process for DoD in the acquisition of buying 
COTS software DoD systems.  DITSCAP ensures vulnerabilities are addressed and 
resolved.  DITSCAP also enhances the security activities by tailoring to the system’s 
lifecycle phase and program strategy.  In addition, the process clearly defines detailed 
tasks for each phase.  Each phase has entering and exiting criteria.  Unfortunately, this is 
a very time consuming process but its quality is rewarding at the end of the process.  
Every risk or vulnerability will be reviewed by all stakeholders.  The product that goes 
through DISCAP will have high confidence.  The process also improves the life cycle of 
the product.   
2. Recommendation for Software COTS Vendors 
COTS software can be used in both DoD and industrial markets.  COTS software 
has been implemented successfully in some DoD applications and other industrial 
applications.  However, there are still cases where COTS fails in DoD and commercial 
applications.  The lack of quality control, cost, and schedule driving the tendencies of the 
commercial world are the main causes of software failures.   The current commercial 
producers’ approach of “fail first, patch later” cannot fit within DoD requirements, 
especially for DoD mission-critical applications.  The current approach also does not 
 32
meet other commercial applications since the damages caused by software failure can put 
some business out of service.  Currently, there is no law to punish software producers 
who sell bad software.  However, in the future, it is expected that there will be a law to 
handle software makers based on damages they cause to other businesses who are the 
victims of their software. Commercial software vendors should have better methods to 
meet DoD security requirements and also to secure their products from the current 
increasing security threats.  COTS software has a very low amount of error free code 
comparing to military software.  For example, how frequent does Microsoft send out 
patches to fix security holes?  And yet, Microsoft is considered the top software company 
worldwide.  Many military software projects reach 95 percent in defect removal 
efficiency, and some have approached 99 percent for DoD weapons and communications 
systems (Caper).  What makes military software have the high percentage of defect free 
code?  DoD has succeeded in their software acquisition because they have a well-
organized and formal quality control and formal project management process.   
Commercial software producers should learn and adopt the success of the military 
process. Compared to industry, DoD is considered to have the best practice and most 
experience in dealing with secure software.  DITSCAP has been a well-known process 
for DoD information system.  Commercial software producers should also follow these 
DoD processes to certify their products due to the tremendous experience DoD has in 
security aspect.  DITSCAP can be applied to either existing or newly developed 
commercial information technology products.  Commercial software producers will 
benefit if applying DITSCAP since it secures the life cycle of a product.  It also helps 
improve the commercial and corporation management approach.  It keeps all 
stakeholders, from program manager to developers, users, and operators in the process to 
implement the product security functions.  DITSCAP also ensures commercial employees 
are aware of their role to protect hackers and intruders from the corporation’s business as 
well as their product.  The incorporation of DITSCAP will make security become a part 
of the company’s routine operation, not a nice-to-have feature.   
 33
 
Figure 10.   Simplified DITSCAP for Commercial Software Vendor (Oar) 
 
Oar has simplified DITSCAP in how it can be used for commercial software 
corporations, as shown in Figure 10 (Oar). 
With a four-phase DITSCAP approach, software companies not only gain the 
security credibility, but also improve the life cycle management process.  Threats 
continue to grow in the Information Technology field and if commercial companies do 
not develop the adequate process to improve the security of their products, they end up 
paying a high price due to lost productivity and revenue.  This concept is the same as if a 
person wants to drive, they have to pass the driving tests and get licensed.  If COTS 
producers want to build better software with high confidence in the current competitive 
market, they have to improve their process. DoD could help commercial developers 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional DoD acquisition is often over budget and behind schedule.  Today, 
DoD faces the challenge of budget reductions.  Meanwhile the demands of providing 
high performance, reliable, and secure products are increasing which require tremendous 
amounts of software upgrades and new developments.  Traditional DoD acquisition does 
not fit in the present DoD budget and requirements environments.  This will force DoD to 
change the acquisition processes to overcome the budget constraints and meet the 
demands for secure software at the same time.  One of the approaches that DoD uses is to 
use COTS products to meet the cost and schedule constraints of DoD programs.  
However, the approach of selecting COTS software to develop and upgrade DoD systems 
has still driven projects over budget and produced schedule delays.  DoD acquisition has 
seemed to underestimate the dependability and security risks of COTS software, and the 
nature of “fail first, patch later” mentality of COTS software vendors.   
In the late 1990s, a lot of research and papers identified the pros and cons of 
applying COTS software in DoD applications.  The biggest issue that commercial 
products face is the security issue.  DoD has its own security requirement due to the 
nature of the operational environment and critical missions.  The approach in which the 
COTS software fails, the consumer can sue or ask for a refund, does not work in DoD 
environment.  If DoD systems fail, lives may be on the line and the nation’s security 
might be jeopardized.  However, the COTS approach is not totally without benefit.  
Reality has proven that military can meet readiness requirements by using COTS 
components.  The question comes down on how to make sure the acquisition of using 
commercial software meets requirements at some expected level.  DoD acquisition has to 
clearly identify the security requirements and carefully select the right product that not 
only meets the performance and readiness requirements but also is fully compliant with 
DoD security certifying process.  DITSCAP is currently the best process to certify a 
system.  Components should be tested in the environment they operate, not on a 
standalone basis.  One should be reluctant to recommend the Common Criteria process.  
It is based on the analysis rather than the real test in the real environment.  In addition to 
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that, some commercial software producers receive certification at EAL4 but their 
products are still at high risk of vulnerability.  Patches are sent out on monthly basis.   
The traditional DoD software approach did not have to deal with security issues 
since it isolates itself from the rest of the world by limiting access physically and 
electronically.  There are locked doors with limited access or guards that make it hard to 
get close to the software.  Software built in house is guarded with encryption, private 
networks, or other electronic means on top of physical guards in place at facilities.  The 
threat to breach software security is much harder.  However, the COTS solution increases 
the risk of security break-in.  DoD acquisition personnel should carefully evaluate the 
COTS solution before making any decision due to the nature mission of DoD systems.  
COTS components may conflict with DoD security constraints.   
Regarding the commercial software industry, the traditional way of putting 
security responsibility on consumers and buyers does not fit in with current trends.  DoD 
acquisition has been changed in the way of management and requirements.  The security 
requirements are now included in DoD specifications and Request for Proposals (RFPs).  
This means that commercial software corporations who want to sell their products to 
DoD need to rethink their approach.  Again, software defects are the causes of 
vulnerabilities and security breaches; therefore, commercial software companies should 
address security at the system level and also address it through out the life cycle of the 
product.  Currently, there are no laws about the punishment of commercial software 
corporations for distributing flawed software.  However, buyers can ask for a refund 
which results in lost revenues and productivity.  Commercial software corporations 
should investigate developing appropriate management processes to handle security and 
reduce defects at the highest level.  In the future commercial developers may very well 
obtain a positive return on their investment in following DoD process such as 
DIACAP/DISCAP if the commercial marketplace becomes increasingly sensitive to the 
need for a high level of security in their software systems.  Security of products will be 




like the DoD’s.  Although it is expensive and time consuming initially, following a 
process like DIACAP may bring a great return when corporations establish formal quality 
control methods.   
It is not recommended that commercial corporations should go through CCEVS 
since the environment of the certification is not really the environment in which the 
software operates.  It is a waste of time and effort to do so.  CCEVS only provides the 
buyers with false confidence.  Successful software will be found where there are good 
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